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GLOBAL IMBALANCES
1. Introduction
The large and persistent current account deficits run
by the United States from the second half of the
1990s have generated widespread concerns about the
sustainability of current macroeconomic imbalances
at the global level. To what extent is the US trade
deficit sustainable? If not, what will global adjust-
ment require? In particular, to what extent will the
dollar depreciate? Will adjustment lead to global
recession? What are the appropriate fiscal, monetary
and financial policies to minimise the risks of disrup-
tion? Many observers (for example, Roubini and
Setser 2004a,b, 2005a,b) fear that the correction of
global imbalances could lead to a period of disorder-
ly adjustment, characterised by turmoil in currency
and asset markets, a slowdown in economic activity,
and ultimately large welfare costs for the world econ-
omy as a whole. 
Currently, large external deficits in the US are
matched by large surpluses in Japan, Asian emerging
markets, oil producing countries and a few European
countries. However, the euro area as a whole is close to
external balance. In light of this, the question is
whether adjustment of global imbalances will affect
Europe only marginally, since the heart of it will con-
sist in rebalancing the position of the US vis-à-vis the
surplus regions, especially Asia.
The goal of this chapter is to review the current
debate on the causes and nature of global imbalances,
assess policy options currently on the table, and more
specifically discuss the implications of global adjust-
ment for the European economy and European poli-
cy-making.1 We argue below that despite the close-to-
external-balance position of Europe a rebalancing of
the US deficits will create major policy challenges to
European policy-makers.
2. Basic facts about global imbalances
We begin by considering three facts defining the
nature of current global imbalances: the size and per-
sistence of the US current account deficit; the rising
share of official capital flows from emerging markets
and Japan, and the increasing importance of “valua-
tion effects” of exchange rate and asset prices move-
ments in determining the real burden of a country’s
external debt. Throughout this chapter we will com-
plement data from traditional sources (such as OECD
and IMF) with the dataset on the “Wealth of
Nations” computed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2006). The distinctive feature of this data set is that
(estimated) capital gains and losses on the external
portfolios of financial assets and liabilities have been
taken into account when calculating net foreign asset
positions. 
2.1 The size and persistence of the US current account
deficit
The single most quoted fact characterising global
imbalances is the size of the US current account
deficits (relevant definitions are presented in Box 2.1).
The US current account deficit grew from 1.6 percent
of US GDP in 1997, to 4.2 percent in the year 2000.
It kept increasing afterwards: at the time of writing,
the 2005 deficit is estimated at above six percent of
US output, around 800 billion dollars. 
To get a sense of how large the US current account
deficit is, consider that the US has about 110 million
households: thus, an 800 billion dollar deficit means
that, during 2005, the net external debt per household
increased by 7,200 dollars!
As a result of current account deficits, and changes in
the values of US assets and liabilities, the estimated
value of US net debt at the beginning of 2004 was
around 23 percent of US GDP. If the US keeps bor-
rowing at the current rate, the external net debt of the
US could approach 100 percent of GDP in about a
decade.
Figure 2.1a shows the evolution of the current
account balance in percentage of world GDP
EEAG Report 50
Chapter 2
1 Recent theoretical, empirical and policy-related contributions to
the debate on global imbalances can be found on the website
‘Current Account Sustainability of Major Industrialized Countries’
at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, 
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between 1996 and 2004, for the US, the euro area,
Japan, Switzerland and the Nordic countries, Asian
emerging markets, and oil producing countries. In
terms of world GDP, the US external deficit grew
from less than half a percent before 1997 to 1.6 per-
cent in 2004.
Figure 2.1a emphasises that all other regions shown
have recently been in surplus. In 2004, the US deficit
was as high as 668 billion dollars. The combined sur-
plus of Asian emerging markets and oil producing
countries (358 billion dollars) accounts for more than
50 percent of it. Japan’s surplus (172 billion dollars)
accounts for about 25 percent; the surplus by Norway,
Sweden and Switzerland (141 billions) accounts for
another 20 percent. The small positive current
account surplus for the euro area accounts for the
remaining five percent of US deficit. 
Box 2.1  
External imbalances, the current account balance and the balance of payments
To understand global imbalances, it is useful to keep in mind that there are three ways of looking at the current account balance.
First, the current account balance of a country is the sum of the trade balance (exports minus imports of goods and services),
income from foreign assets held by residents (net of interest paid on the country’s foreign liabilities), and net labour income from
residents working abroad:
Current account balance       = Trade balance (goods and services) + Income from net foreign assets + Net labour income
This accounting relation makes it clear that the accumulation of foreign wealth by a country is related to its capacity to generate
positive net exports of goods and services, income from capital lent abroad and labour services supplied by domestic residents
employed in a foreign country. Movements of the current account are usually dominated by the trade balance component, but not
to the extent suggested by national accounts. The reason is that official statistics include income payments from net foreign assets,
but do not account for capital gains and losses on such assets. At times, these may be substantial (throughout this chapter we use
the dataset constructed by Philip Lane and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, who reconsider current account balance and portfolio
positions accounting for capital gains and losses on foreign assets and liabilities).  
Second, the current account is also equal to the difference between nationalsaving and investment:
Current account balance       =  Saving – Investment = Private saving + Public saving – Investment
This accounting relation makes it clear that external imbalances result from intertemporal choices by firms and households
regarding how much to consume and invest in the current year as opposed to future years, as well as by government decisions
about the size of the budget deficit (that is, the time profile of taxes and expenditure). Clearly, for the world economy as a whole,
saving must equal investment, although the sum of current account balances rarely adds up to zero because of statistical errors. 
Third, the balance-of-payments identity equates surpluses in the current account balance to the accumulation of net foreign assets, 
recorded in the capital account:  
Current account balance       =  Increase in private net foreign assets + Increase in official net reserve holdings
(Official reserve settlement balance)
This identity makes it clear that current account deficits must be financed by capital inflows and/or changes in the stock of
reserves held by monetary authorities. So, a current account deficit by one country generates a demand for foreign capital, which
must be matched by the portfolio decisions of foreign private agents and public institutions to acquire assets issued by that
country.
The above are not three alternative views of the current account balance; they are three identities.
A country is solvent when, at the market interest rate, the present discounted value of future surpluses of the balance of trade in
goods and services and net income from labour supplied abroad,  is not smaller than the current net value of liabilities:
Value of net foreign liabilities  Present discounted value of surpluses in the current account excluding income from net
 foreign assets
So, if a country is currently running current account deficits and is a net debtor, foreign lenders expect that country to generate
positive net exports (in trade and services) and net labour income in the future, corresponding to a positive difference between net
saving and investment. If this were not the case, some creditor country must be willing to finance the entire interest bill by the
debtor country in the indefinite future. The debtor country would be playing a so-called Ponzi game: it would try to finance the 
interest bill on an ever-increasing stock of debt by further borrowing. 
In the international financial markets, the supply of assets by a borrower must be matched by the world demand for them.
Sustainability of a country’s debt cannot be defined independently of the equilibrium structure of international portfolios. In
particular, given demand and supply conditions, the equilibrium price at which a country’s debt is traded determines the risk
premium that a country must pay on its external liabilities. The main challenge in understanding sustainability of external debt
thus consists in understanding the factors underlying the desired portfolio composition by international investors.
Recent episodes of financial and currency crises have arguably pointed to the possibility that frictions in financial markets may 
cause sudden changes in asset demands and the emergence of binding constraints limiting the extent to which a country can
borrow. This could be the case, for instance, if co-ordination problems among international investors long in short term debt
issued by a country lead to liquidity runs similar to bank runs. When markets co-ordinate on an equilibrium characterised by a
run, the debtor country is forced to come up quickly with external resources to close any “financing gap” which may result.
International runs (panics) can easily have potentially high costs in terms of consumption, output and overall welfare for
international debtors.From a global perspective, the
US is borrowing resources from
all the other five regions in the
diagram, including regions at a
relatively early stage of industri-
alisation.
However, the US is not the only
industrial country to run a cur-
rent account deficit. Persistent
imbalances are also run by
Australia and New Zealand
(together they borrowed 45 bil-
lion dollars in 2004), and by a few
countries in the euro area. The
deficits by Greece, Portugal,
Spain, and the United Kingdom
altogether totalled 124 billion
dollars in 2004. Italy’s deficit has
also been increasing steadily,
reaching 15 billion dollars in
2004, and showing no sign of
reduction in 2005. While deficits
by some of these countries are
not too distant from the US if, for
instance, net borrowing is scaled
by the size of the population of
GDP, their sizes are typically
small in absolute terms. 
2.2 International reserves 
accumulation and the rising share
of official financing after 2000
An important change in the com-
position of external financing of
the US deficit occurred around
2000. From 1997 to 2001, that is,
between the Asian crisis and the
end of the period of asset market
exuberance, private investors
mostly financed the US deficits
as they systematically rebalanced
their portfolios in favour of US
dollar-denominated assets, espe-
cially equities. The importance of
private inflows has diminished
substantially since 2001. 
As shown in Table 2.1, in the
period 1997–1999 average net
capital inflows into the US were






Private and official financing of the US current account deficit
(in billion of dollars)
1997–1999 2000–2002 2003–2004 
Current account deficit 218  427  594 
Total net capital inflows 176  462  573 
    Net private inflows 160  404  233 
   Of which:
   Direct investment 34  38  – 109 
Portfolio investment 126  366  343 
 Net official inflows 15  59  340 
Source: Own calculations based on Congressional Budget Office (2005).EEAG Report 53
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year: private inflows accounted for 90 percent of the
total. In 2003 and 2004, average net capital inflows
into the US were as high as 573 billion dollars: the
share of private capital dropped to 40 percent. In
terms of net flows, the US external imbalance is now
mainly financed through foreign official lending, in
large part corresponding to the build-up of official
reserves by five Asian economies: Japan, China, Hong
Kong, Taiwan and South Korea. 
The above observation stresses a second striking
dimension of current global imbalances, that is, the
high level of international reserves in the form of dol-
lar assets. Official reserves held by the five Asian
countries mentioned above (consisting to a large
extent of dollar-denominated assets) grew from
1.16 trillion dollars in 2000 to 2.66 trillion dollars in
2004. China is reported to own reserves up to 800 bil-
lion dollars in the last months of 2005 (see Genberg et
al. 2005 for a detailed analysis of reserves policies). 
From a more general perspective, Table 2.2 and
Figure 2.2 show the growth of total official reserves
by developing countries in percent of their liabilities:
official reserves have grown from 15 percent in the
1980s, to an average of 26 percent after the year 2000,
up to 32 percent in 2004. Now, developing countries
pay a high risk premium on their liabilities but earn a
low interest rate on their official reserves. Since in
2004 foreign official reserves accounted for about one
third of developing countries’ foreign liabilities, one
out of three dollars that relatively poor countries bor-
rowed from rich countries at high interest rates was
thus lent back to rich countries at relatively low inter-
est rates. Rodrik (2006) estimates that the financial
cost of holding reserves is now currently close to one
percent of developing countries’ GDP.
2.3 Financial globalisation and the increasing 
importance of capital gains and losses due to exchange
rate movements
The emergence of external imbalances at the end of
the last decade occurred in the context of a strong
expansion of cross-border holdings of financial
instruments. Indeed, in terms of world GDP, the total
stock of foreign assets (= liabilities) in the world is
currently above 120 percent, twice as much as at the
beginning of the 1990s. 
So, while the US current account deficit is large in
terms of the US GDP, it is small relative to the stock
of US foreign assets. This point is clearly shown by
Figure 2.3, plotting the US current account between
1970 and 2004 together with the stock of US gross
external assets and liabilities. In 2004, the US “owed”
more than 100 percent of its GDP to foreigners, but
also owned claims to foreign output equivalent to
about 80 percent of its own output. The difference is
the US net debt. 
The large expansion of gross
portfolio holdings is responsible
for a third, important dimension
of current global imbalances.
The change in net external debt
between two dates depends not
only on the flow of net exports
during the period but also on
changes in the value of the coun-
try’s foreign assets and liabilities,
reflecting both asset price and
exchange rates movements: the
larger the stock of foreign assets
and liabilities, the larger are these
“valuation effects”. Valuation
effects in the asset markets were
clearly much smaller in previous
episodes of current account ad-
Table 2.2  







Source: Own calculations based on Congressional
Budget Office (2005).
Figure 2.2justment, before capital liberalisation had led to large
cross-border holdings of financial assets. Para-
doxically, in a financially globalised economy, a coun-
try with a balanced current account may be subject to
large swings in its net external position, because of
price fluctuations in financial and currency markets.
Figure 2.1b shows the evolution of net foreign assets
for the same regions as in Figure 2.1a. As mentioned
above, the figures underlying this graph are from the
dataset on the “Wealth of Nations” by Lane and
Milesi Ferretti (2006), specifically built to account for
capital gains and losses on the external portfolios.
Figure 2.1b shows that, in the second half of the
sample period, both the euro area and the US had
negative net asset positions (they are net debtors),
whereas the other macro regions had positive net
asset positions (they are net creditors in the world
economy). 
Comparing Figures 2.1a and 2.1b, one can appreciate
an apparent anomaly in the evolution of the net for-
eign asset position of the US and the euro area after
the year 2002. After 2002, the current account of the
US is negative and large, yet its foreign asset position
was stable, even improving. The euro area has been
running a surplus, yet its foreign asset position has
worsened.
This observation provides a striking illustration of the
effects of capital gains and losses from exchange rate
movements on external imbalances. The US typically
borrows from international markets by issuing dollar-
denominated assets but lends abroad mostly by
acquiring equities and foreign-currency denominated
bonds. About two-thirds of US
foreign assets are denominated in
foreign currency. Because of this
particular currency composition
of the US external portfolio, a
falling dollar has an automatic
stabilising effect on the real value
of the US net foreign debt. Dol-
lar depreciation leaves the dollar
value of US foreign liabilities
unaffected but raises the dollar
value of US foreign assets: over-
all, the US owes less to the rest of
the world in terms of real re-
sources (see the discussion in
Tille 2003). 
To get a sense of the potential
magnitude of these effects, recall that, at the end of
2004, US gross foreign assets were about 80 percent
of US GDP. As two third of these were denominat-
ed in foreign assets, a 10 percent depreciation of the
dollar would reduce US net debt by 0.1 * 0.8 * 2/3,
equivalent to more than five percent of US GDP:
approximately the size of the US external deficit!2
Note that these gains are increasing in the size of
US gross assets, independently of US gross and net
debt.
The above net gains are however calculated ex post,
that is, for given stocks of assets and liabilities. The
gains are clearly smaller if currency depreciation is
anticipated by financial markets. If this is the case, ex
ante US interest rates would rise relative to foreign
ones. This would raise the growth rate of liabilities in
terms of GDP, so that depreciation-related capital
gains on US assets would be at least in part compen-
sated by a higher stock of US gross debt. To complete
our back-of-the-envelope calculations, suppose that,
at the beginning of 2004, markets attached a 25 per-
cent probability to a ten percent fall in the value of
the dollar by the end of the year. Abstracting from
any risk premium, one-year interest rates on US lia-
bilities would have increased by 2.5 percentage
points. Now, at the beginning of 2004 the stock of
US gross liabilities was close to 95 percent of GDP
(clearly higher than the stock of assets). Assuming




2 The mechanism benefiting the US is the same (but with an oppo-
site sign) as the mechanism raising financial and macroeconomic
risks in emerging markets: as these borrow by issuing debt denomi-
nated in foreign currency, domestic devaluation in response to nega-
tive shocks magnifies macroeconomic adjustment problems by rais-
ing the real burden of external debt (see Chapter 6 of the 2004
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maturity, higher interest rates would have raised the
stock of US gross debt by an extra 2.4 percentage
points, halving the net ex-post gains from dollar
depreciation.3
Moreover, it is well known that US foreign assets
have a large equity component. This component
exposes the US to market risks, due to sizeable
changes in asset prices that may accompany rebal-
ancing. In fairly extreme scenarios of the adjustments
(for example, a worldwide recession), it is likely that
there would be significant declines in equity values.
Then, for a given exchange rate, US assets abroad
would fall in value relatively more than foreign
investors’ holding of US assets. This would seem to
offset some of the advantages that the US has from
exchange rate depreciation.
3. What has caused the current
imbalances?
There are a number of views on
the causes of current imbal-
ances, with quite different impli-
cations for the need for correc-
tive policy measures and differ-
ent predictions about the costs
of adjustment. In this section we
briefly discuss a representative
set of these theories, grouping
them under four main headings
depending on their focus: insuf-
ficient US savings, productivity
growth differentials, excessive
savings outside the US, and ex-
change rate policies pursued by
Asian countries.
3.1 Low US saving 
A widespread view attributes the
persistent US current account
imbalances to structural factors
and policies lowering US nation-
al savings.
As is well known, private savings
in the US have been trending
downward for quite some time.
Possible factors likely to have
influenced this trend include
population ageing; structural
changes in financial markets,
boosting the use of credit cards and consumer credit;
and, in the framework of deregulated credit markets,
the recent strong dynamics of housing prices. 
Last, but not least, private spending in the US has long
been sustained by easy monetary policy. While the US
monetary stance has been progressively tightened in
2005 (see Section 1.2 and Figure 1.9 in Chapter 1 of
this report), long-term interest rates have remained
low. For this reason, and because of tax advantages
benefiting mortgages, the US housing market
remained overall strong through 2005, helping to offset
the demand effect of the monetary contraction.4
Box 2.2 
Real return differentials in favour of the US
The US enjoys an important advantage in international capital markets. Historic-
ally, the rates of return earned by the US on its external assets are above the rates of
return the US pays on its liabilities. For instance, taking five-year averages, the
return differentials in favour of the US between 1995 and 2004 vary between one
and approximately eight percentage points.
What explains these positive return differentials? Potential explanations include the
following. First, a large share of US foreign assets consists of equities, while US
liabilities consist mostly of debt instrument with a large short-term component: the
US benefits from the fact that equities earn a premium over bonds. Second, since
dollar-denominated bonds are traded in deep liquid markets, they earn a liquidity
premium: the US can borrow at particularly low interest rates. Third, dollar
monetary assets are an important component of international liquidity, providing
the US with seigniorage revenue. Because of positive rate of return differentials, 
total income from net foreign assets earned by the US was still positive in 2005,
even though the country is a large net debtor in the world economy. This may soon
change as the stock of US liabilities keeps increasing.
The fact that the US has long earned a positive income from its net foreign assets
has recently been used to suggest the following provocative thesis: because an
international debtor should pay an interest income to its creditor; the fact that the
US is actually receiving income from abroad means that it cannot be a net debtor.
By way of example: in 2004, the US earned 300 billion dollars. Capitalised at
5 percent, this means that the US should actually have positive net foreign wealth
of 600 billions (see Cline 2005 and Hausmann and Sturzenegger 2006).
But how can the US be a net foreign creditor after running large current account
deficits for so many years? Hausmann and Sturzenegger call the difference between
recorded US net debt and their estimate of positive US net wealth “dark matter”. 
Dark matter is a colourful label pointing to under-reporting of US exports of
knowledge (via foreign direct investment), liquidity (the US issues widely traded
assets) and insurance (dollar assets are sought after as official reserves). The 
existence of “dark matter” implies that the value of US foreign assets and liabilities
must be well above their market value (estimated by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
2006). Does “dark matter” exist? If it does, there would be no need for global
adjustments of the type discussed in the text. Unfortunately, the calculations
underlying estimates of “dark matter” completely ignore the basic fact that different
assets can pay different rates of return, depending on their risk and maturity. Why
should one apply the same rate of capitalisation (5 percent) to all the assets and
liabilities in the US external portfolio? Moreover, the debt figures presented in this
chapter are all estimated taking into account market valuation in stocks and bonds
markets, as well as exchange rates in the currency markets. Why should one distrust
market prices completely, and put one’s faith on a simple capitalisation exercise at
an arbitrary rate of return?
3 When market expectations anticipate depreciation, the size of net
gains also depends on the maturity structure of debt.
4 Some sign of house price stabilisation has been detected through-
out the year (see the Economist 2005). House prices have been high
and rising through the last few years also in some of the other indus-
trial countries that, like the US, have a persistent current account
deficit. This applies to Australia, New Zealand, Spain and the UK.
See also Chapter 5 of the 2005 EEAG Report. US private savings have, however, followed a rather
stable pattern, compared to US public savings, which
have deteriorated markedly since 2000 (see Chapter 1
of the report). The relaxed fiscal policy adopted by
the Bush administration has been blamed for worsen-
ing the external position of the country, when other
factors (essentially, exuberant expectations in the
asset market) were no longer influencing domestic
spending and international investment. Recent imbal-
ances would thus validate the “twin deficits” hypoth-
esis, that is, the idea that fiscal shocks raising the bud-
get deficit also raise the current account deficit. 
An important question is whether the recent US bud-
get and current account deficits are efficient ways to
finance the costs of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq,
as well as the costs of dealing with terrorist threats
and unexpected events such as the Katrina hurricane
in 2005. Through domestic and foreign borrowing,
US residents can in fact smooth their consumption
and investment in the case of government spending
hikes, avoiding highly distortionary peaks in tax rates.
The argument of tax and consumption smoothing has
strong theoretical foundations. Yet the implied benign
view of the US external imbalance is not warranted.
In particular, the argument disregards the basic fact
that most of the US budget deficits result from tax
cuts which the Bush administra-
tion has been struggling to make
permanent. While current tax
cuts mainly benefit current gener-
ations, future generations will
have to service the interest bill on
the higher domestic and external
debt. The argument of efficient
tax smoothing in the face of tem-
porary spending hikes does not
apply. Rather, what is at stake is
re-distribution across income
classes and across generations in
a direction that amplifies long-
run fiscal and macroeconomic
concerns about population age-
ing (see Chapter 4 of the 2005
EEAG Report). 
The view attributing external
imbalances to low public savings
in the US has been recently chal-
lenged by some researchers, who
point out that fiscal shocks and
autonomous changes in spending
appear to have only limited
quantitative effects on the current account. According
to that argument, the impact of fiscal shocks on US
investment and saving is so high that at the margin
only 20 cents out of each deficit-financed dollar trans-
lates into excess demand for foreign imports (see
Bussière et al. 2005, Chinn and Ito 2005, Erceg et al.
2004 and Ferguson 2005 among others). Some
authors go as far as to question the validity of the
“twin-deficit hypothesis” altogether (see Kim and
Roubini 2003). 
However, even if current fiscal changes that increase
budget deficits had no sizeable contemporaneous
effects on the current account, budget deficits would
still have important effects on the sustainability of the
US current account. As argued by Corsetti and
Mueller (2005), the return to capital in an open econ-
omy generally responds to fluctuations in the real
exchange rate: fiscal shocks leading to real apprecia-
tion lower the return to current investment and hence
cause crowding-out effects. To the extent that fiscal
deficits crowd out private investment, a lower stock of
capital in the future would reduce the ability of the
US economy to meet its external interest bill without
reducing domestic consumption. In other words, con-
sumption of goods or leisure would have to be cut in




Useful exchange rate and international relative price definitions
The nominal exchange rate is the price of one currency (the dollar) in terms of
another (the euro). In January 2006, one euro is worth approximately 1.20 dollars.
An increase in this figure would correspond to a nominal appreciation of the euro
(one euro buys more dollars), that is, a nominal depreciation of the dollar. The
external value of a currency can be calculated with reference to many currencies. In
this case one talks of a multilateral (as opposed to a bilateral) exchange rate.
Multilateral effective exchange rates are calculated as weighted averages of
bilateral exchange rates (the euro against the dollar, the yen, the sterling pound
etc.), weighted by importance of foreign trade with different trade partners.
Alternative weighting schemes can be based on GDP or financial portfolios.
The real exchange rate is the price of consumption in one country relative to the
price of consumption in another country. A real depreciation (or a depreciation in
real terms) indicates that the consumption basket in one country become less
expensive relative to that in another country (or group of countries). According to
its definition, the real exchange rate is calculated using consumer prices. As an 
indicator of competitiveness, it is sometimes calculated using producer prices or
labour costs (usually per unit of product)..
The consumer price index includes the price of both goods that are traded
internationally and goods that are not traded internationally (commonly refereed to
as non-tradables or non-traded goods). A good is not traded internationally when,
given technology and relative prices, its value is small relative to transportation and
trade costs, so that its shipment abroad is not economically viable. Given the price
of tradable goods, a fall in the price of non-tradables in a country (which lowers the
domestic consumer price index) implies a real depreciation (that is a depreciation of
the real exchange rate).
The terms of trade are the price of exports relative to the price of imports. The 
terms of trade worsen, or deteriorate, when the price of imports rises, or the price of
exports falls.EEAG Report 57
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Thus, whether or not a policy correction to the US fis-
cal stance has an immediate impact on the US exter-
nal trade, greater fiscal discipline would surely help
reduce imbalances in an intertemporal perspective.5
3.2 Expectations of sustained US productivity growth
A different argument emphasises expectations of sus-
tained productivity growth differentials in favour of
the US. Expectations of high productivity growth
have arguably played an important role in generating
strong US domestic demand in the second half of the
1990s, while making investment in the US relatively
attractive to foreigners. The question is whether and
to what extent this factor is still important.
We have seen in the previous section that private cap-
ital inflows into the US have fallen after 2000. As
shown by Table 2.1, the average net inflow of foreign
direct investment actually turned negative after 2003,
while foreign demand for US equities levelled off,
mostly because of a shift in the demand by Europeans
(Congressional Budget Office 2005). Figure 2.4 shows
that, on balance, the stock of US net equity and
cumulated FDI positions decreased rapidly in the
1990s and became negative after 2000; since then,
however, it has been increasing again. This evidence is
inconsistent with the hypothesis that international
investors are currently “chasing investment opportu-
nities” in the US, motivated by superior productivity
performance.
Nonetheless, expectations of high productivity and
income gains in the future may be a factor underlying
the low saving rates (discussed above), a point
stressed by Ferguson (2005). In the same vein, Engel
and Rogers (2005) focus on the US share in output
produced by advanced countries (including the G7
plus Switzerland, Sweden and Norway).6 This share
fluctuates between 38 and 40 percent before 1990; it
then trends upward, reaching 44 percent in 2004.
Most importantly, current forecasts imply a further
increase along the same trend. According to the cal-
culations by Engel and Rogers, the US is expected to
account for 49 percent of developed countries output
by 2017. In light of such forecasts, current account
deficits up to five to seven percent of US GDP may be
rationalised in terms of efficient consumption
smoothing: US households are simply taking advan-
tage of borrowing opportunities to consume part of
their anticipated future income gains now.
The view that US external deficits are essentially dri-
ven by expectations of high future growth in income
has two important policy implications. First, it is not
appropriate to talk about “imbalances”, as trade
flows are in fact balanced in an intertemporal per-
spective. Running a deficit today, US residents are
increasing current expenditure by borrowing
resources from foreign residents, in exchange for
future resources capitalised at the market interest
rate. Second, little or no dollar depreciation in real
terms may be required for some time. In the Engel
and Rogers’ version of conventional open macro
analysis, the dollar is strong (in real terms) during the
phase of high external deficits, and will weaken once
the US share in the advanced countries’ GDP sta-
bilises. As stressed by these authors, such stabilisa-
tion will happen quite a few years from now.
Moreover, when it comes, there would be nothing
dramatic in the real dollar depre-
ciation that will accompany the
US current account reversal.7
But, as mentioned above, it is
unclear why the optimistic fore-
casts of future growth driving
Figure 2.4
5 An interesting analysis discussing US fis-
cal policy in relation to the possible asset
market bubble in the 1990s is Kraay and
Ventura (2005).
6 Engel and Rogers (2005) carry out their
analysis in terms of net GDP. This is
derived by subtracting investment and
government final consumption of goods
and services from output. In intertempo-
ral models of the current account, net
GDP measures the flow of resources that
households can devote in each period
either to current consumption or to the
acquisition of foreign assets to finance
future consumption.
7 Such a portfolio perspective on dollar
adjustment dynamics is discussed by
Blanchard et. al (2005).US consumption would not also cause foreign direct
investment into the US and/or acquisition of US
equities by foreigners. 
Most importantly, current expectations about US dif-
ferential growth may be too optimistic (after all,
expectations systematically underestimated prospec-
tive US growth rates in the early 1990s). If and when
expectations are revised downwards, restoring US
external balance (in an intertemporal perspective)
would require a sharp correction of spending plans,
possibly implying large movements in exchange rates
and relative prices (as discussed later on in this chap-
ter). Note that the above view completely downplays
the role of US government budget deficits in generat-
ing the current account deficits.
3.3 Excess saving outside the US: the “saving glut” or
”investment drought” view
Another view, which also downplays the idea of insuf-
ficient US savings, interprets the US current account
imbalance as the mirror image of excess supply of
saving in the rest of the world: according to Bernanke
(2005), the US current account deficit is the counter-
part of a global saving glut. This corresponds to an
increase in saving in excess of investment in emerging
markets after the series of currency and financial
crises throughout the 1990s. The glut is magnified by
rising surpluses in oil-producing countries that bene-
fit from high oil prices. 
The saving glut is essentially caused by “self-insur-
ance” policies pursued by many emerging-market
economies to minimise the risks of future crises and
liquidity runs. In practice, many countries have pur-
sued macroeconomic policies that turned external
deficits into surpluses, while building extremely large
stocks of international reserves. 
One may object that excess saving in emerging-market
economies could be matched by relatively small
deficits in all industrial countries, rather than by a
large deficit in one country only. To address this
objection, the saving glut view points to differences in
the macroeconomic, legal and institutional environ-
ment in which national financial markets operate:
because of these differences, international investors
perceive US assets to have higher “quality” than the
assets of other countries. For instance, asset quality
depends on the extent to which investors’ rights are
protected: since the US offers a high level of such pro-
tection, US assets are preferred by world savers look-
ing for opportunities of portfolio investment and
diversification. According to this view, the US deficits
mainly depend on the fact that excess world savings
are channelled preferentially to the US.
An obvious problem with this view is that while it can
rationalise the increasing role of monetary institu-
tions in providing financing to the US as a conse-
quence of self-insurance policies pursued by many
governments in emerging markets, it cannot explain
the increasing disaffection of private investors
towards US equities (see Table 2.1 and Figure 2.4).
While the saving glut idea may have had some merit
before 2000, it needs to be refined to fit recent global
portfolio patterns.8
Moreover, some observers (notably Roubini and
Setser 2004a,b and 2005a,b) emphasise that the sav-
ing-investment imbalance outside the US is to a large
extent due to abnormally low investment rates: thus,
it should be labelled an “investment drought” rather
than a “saving glut” (see also the evidence in Chinn
and Ito 2005). With the exception of China and a few
other countries, investment rates have fallen marked-
ly across emerging markets.9 In South-East Asian
economies, the drops have been as high as 10 percent-
age points of GDP from the peak in the first half of
the 1990s. One may argue, however, that the rate of
investment corresponding to those peaks was not sus-
tainable (see Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini 1999).
Investment rates have also fallen in Japan and most
noticeably in the euro area.10 Low capital accumula-
tion may be due to the need by many corporations to
clean up their balance sheets after the financial tur-
moil around 2000 (International Monetary Fund
2005) or simply to “animal spirits” of entrepreneurs. 
In either case, the “investment drought” view offers a
potential explanation of the observed low levels of
real interest rates. The standard textbook model pre-
dicts that an exogenous drop in investment demand
indeed reduces the equilibrium rate of interest (by
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8 Caballero et al. (2006) reconsider this issue in a model with three
regions: a fast-growing US-type region, a slow-growing Europe-type
region, and an industrialising region with exceptional growth oppor-
tunities, modelled to reflect Asian emerging markets. Notably, in the
latter region, financial markets cannot supply quality assets because
there are frictions generating constraints on asset supply. For this
reason, in this region investment is mainly financed by firms’ man-
agers/owners, without the participation of savers. The model can do
reasonably well in accounting for recent patterns of global financial
flows. According to this analysis, both a slowdown in the Europe-
type region and a crash in the asset market in the emerging-market
region can cause an external deficit in the US-like region. Either
shock produces a prolonged period of low real interest rates.
9 See Chapter 2 of International Monetary Fund (2005) for a
detailed analysis.
10 Some of the investment fall can, however, be attributed to a secu-
lar decline in the relative price of investment goods.EEAG Report 59
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how much depends on the interest elasticity of sav-
ings). As an implication, one may expect interest rates
to rise as soon as investment picks up again.
3.4 Chinese economic policy and Asian currency pegs
The view that Asian emerging markets have substan-
tially contributed to generating current global imbal-
ances emphasises both a trade channel (related to the
size of the Asian external surplus) and a financial
channel (related to the increasing weight of official
lending by Asian countries in international net capital
flows).
The main focus is, however, on China’s exchange rate
policy and its strong influence on the policies pur-
sued by the other emerging markets in Asia.
Formally, China abandoned its inflexible peg against
the US dollar in July 2005, when it switched to a
managed float, allowing the renminbi to fluctuate
inside a small band around the dollar parity (see Box
1.2 of Chapter 1 of this report). Despite such re-
form, the Chinese renminbi hardly appreciated
through the second half of 2005. Reserve accumula-
tion has kept outpacing the trade and FDI surpluses
by a large amount.11 
The dollar peg regime is an important element in
China’s strategy to achieve rapid industrialisation,
which also includes strict capital controls de-linking
the domestic financial and banking sector from the
rest of the world, thus allowing Chinese authorities to
pursue country-specific credit policies and retain
some control over domestic monetary policy.12
Standard growth models predict that a financially
closed economy (such as China), converging to the
higher income level of industrial countries should
generate high investment and saving rates (see, for
example, Cuñat and Maffezzoli 2004). Indeed,
Chinese investment and saving rates are high by
international standards: official sources reported
gross investment to be 43 percent of GDP in 2003
(recent GDP revisions, however, may lower this per-
centage significantly). Obviously, to generate exter-
nal surpluses, China has engineered even higher sav-
ing rates. 
As the Chinese economy has been growing at a sus-
tained rate of around 9 percent per year, households
can reasonably be expected to have a strong incentive
to borrow against higher future income. How can
extraordinarily high growth rates be reconciled with
low consumption and excess saving? Traditional
explanations point to credit policies pursued by
Chinese banks, firmly directed towards the growth
objectives of the government in terms of industriali-
sation and export. Recent views also stress that with
the recent transformation of the business sector,
Chinese employees face the need to finance their
retirement, the education of their children, and health
services, as state-owned companies no longer provide
support in these areas (Chamon and Prasad 2006;
Blanchard and Giavazzi 2005). With an increase in
lifetime income uncertainty, high savings may corre-
spond to an inefficiently high level of self-insurance.
Finally, by worsening the country’s terms of trade,
undervaluation of the exchange rate reduces the pur-
chasing power, and therefore the wealth of domestic
households. Overall, a strategy of export-led rapid
industrialisation appears to be accompanied by poli-
cies discouraging domestic (consumption) demand. 
These considerations help address a rather puzzling
feature of the Chinese dollar peg, that is, the extent to
which Chinese authorities have managed to avoid
overheating and relative price correction for so many
years. Despite the high GDP growth rates, there has
so far been little evidence of inflationary pressure and
overheating leading to revaluation in real terms: in
2004 overall CPI inflation rose significantly (reaching
a peak as high as 5 percent in the third quarter of the
year), but it subsequently fell below 2 percent in 2005.
According to available statistics, wages and non-trad-
ed goods prices do not show appreciable changes. As
often argued, an important reason has been an
extremely elastic supply of labour (see, for example,
Dooley et al. 2005). But in light of the arguments
above, structural factors and policies containing
domestic demand have also played a role.
Overheating and inflation risk, however, is only one
possible undesired effect of the Chinese exchange rate
and export promotion policies. Price competitiveness
as well as tax and credit incentives for exporting firms
have arguably distorted the allocation of capital and
employment. In this respect, some studies report that
Chinese total factor productivity has fallen between
the first and the second half of the 1990s. Blanchard
and Giavazzi (2005) attribute such a fall mostly to
misallocation, that is excessive investment in the
11 Dooley et al. (2003 and 2004) interpret the current international
monetary and exchange rate regime with dollar pegs and large dol-
lar reserve accumulation as a revised Bretton Woods regime. See
Roubini and Setser (2005a) for a critical view.
12 A weak currency feeds a strong external demand for Chinese prod-
ucts, encouraging investment, but it also raises prices of imported
intermediate and capital goods. However, the bulk of infrastructure
building is based on local and non-traded goods, and FDI flows have
remained substantial. export sector. The financial side of real distortions is
excessive exposure of Chinese banks and financial
institutions to low-return firms, whose profitability
would be completely compromised were the exchange
rate to appreciate. Many observers argue that the
stock of non-performing loans by the state-owned
Chinese banking system is already large: the persis-
tence of distorted relative prices may bring it to quite
dangerous levels. Rising financial risks imply a rising
fiscal risk for the Chinese government.
The policy pursued by China and other Asian coun-
tries has global implications for world demand and
international prices. High rates of Chinese growth
have raised world demand for some capital goods as
well as for commodities, especially energy, which are
necessary to sustain the expansion of infrastructure
and productive capacity. On the other hand, excessive
saving (relative to investment) has limited the Chinese
contribution to the world demand for consumption
goods at large, possibly reducing the relative price of
consumption in terms of investment goods. This has
had a selective impact on the profitability of invest-
ment in industrial countries (countries specialised in
light manufacturing and consumer goods have obvi-
ously suffered the most). 
It is important to distinguish between long-run effects
of the ongoing integration of China and other emerg-
ing markets into the world economy and the short-
and medium-run effects of the exchange rate and
macroeconomic policies described above. As regards
the long run, classical trade theory offers precise pre-
dictions about the economic repercussions of inte-
grating large regions with abundant labour and a
small capital stock: as the global supply of labour
(and especially of low-skilled labour) rises faster than
global capital, the world economy will experience a
fall in the relative price of (unskilled) labour relative
to capital and a fall in the relative price of labour-
intensive goods. The integration process could make
unskilled workers in industrial countries worse off
while making capital owners better off than would
otherwise be the case (the policy issues implied by
these movements were addressed in Chapters 2 and 3
of the 2005 EEAG report). 
In the short and medium-run, most estimates of the
equilibrium exchange rates between China and the
rest of the world point to undervaluation of the ren-
minbi in real terms: estimates vary between 20 and
40 percent. Undervaluation creates a cost advantage
to Chinese exporters on top and above what is implied
by their comparative advantages but also keeps
Chinese terms of trade abnormally low and distorts
the internal relative price between traded and non-
traded goods. A 20-40 percent real exchange rate
appreciation would not wipe out export growth of
China nor eliminate the need for adjustment in the
production structure of industrial countries. Such a
correction would nonetheless rebalance the Chinese
macroeconomy in a decisive way.
There are several reasons to expect revaluation of the
Chinese currency in the coming months. First, after a
period of extraordinary expansion of China’s manu-
facturing base, the benefit of further expansion may
be low relative to the costs of allocation distortions
(including environmental costs). Second, revaluation
could prevent the build-up of protectionist pressures
in the US, sheltering the Chinese government from
charges of currency manipulation. While improving
the US trade deficit, however, a renminbi revaluation
may also be associated with a substantial slowdown in
the rate of reserve accumulation, that is, it may reduce
the contribution of official inflows to finance current
US imbalances. 
It is unclear at what speed, if any, China will under-
take some steps towards liberalisation of capital
flows. Concerns about the health of its financial insti-
tutions may induce caution in exposing Chinese
financial markets to the risks of volatile capital
flows.13 At this stage, an asymmetric relaxation of
controls on capital inflows is a relatively low-risk
option because of widespread revaluation expecta-
tions. In general, capital controls are notoriously dif-
ficult to implement: they may become less and less
stringent over time, or even force Chinese authorities
to accelerate the pace of liberalisation of capital
movements. 
4. What does global adjustment require?
Concerns about US current account imbalances are
often played down by stressing that, thanks to finan-
cial globalisation, markets can finance increasingly
large imbalances, and let “adjustment” proceed
smoothly and gradually (an influential view voiced by
Greenspan 2004). According to this argument, rela-
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13 By reducing profitability of firms now exporting thanks to subsi-
dies and a low exchange rate, a revaluation may generate bankrupt-
cies and costs for financial institutions. To the extent that the bank-
ing system is public, these costs will deteriorate the fiscal balance of
China. In addition, a revaluation will create capital losses on the vast
reserve holdings by the Chinese central bank (now around 40 percent
of GDP). EEAG Report 61
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tive to the pre-globalisation world, market depth and
efficiency reduce the need of domestic governments to
implement policy corrections. 
As discussed above, financial globalisation has led to
unprecedented cross-border holdings of foreign assets
and liabilities, whose value fluctuates with the
exchange rate. The importance of capital gains and
losses in determining the real burden of a country’s
debt has led many observers to talk about a new “val-
uation channel” in the adjustment process, which
complements adjustment via net exports. In the case
of the US, the valuation channel functions as a shock
absorber, providing an additional reason to expect a
smooth resolution to the problem of stabilising the
US external debt, as was discussed in Section 2.3.
However, financial globalisation raises the possibility
of large reversals in capital flows, because interna-
tional investors (perhaps led by hedge funds and other
large active players in international markets) may all
at the same time attempt to shift out of US short- and
medium-term bonds. In the presence of sudden capi-
tal flow reversals, current account and trade adjust-
ment become central. If the US needs to increase its
net exports over a short period of time, reducing
imports and boosting exports will require a downturn
in economic activity and/or a sharp downward move-
ment of the US dollar. In this section we reconsider
this debate and its implications for the external value
of the dollar in detail.14
4.1 Real dollar depreciation: the goods market and the
domestic demand channel
What is the size of dollar real depreciation consistent
with correcting US imbalances? In a series of papers,
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001, 2004, 2005) have
addressed this question by focusing on the equilibri-
um relative price adjustment required to eliminate the
US current account deficit (say, because a sudden
reversal of capital flows prevents the US from rolling
over its debt). The relative prices of interest include
the terms of trade, that is the price of exports in terms
of the price of imports, and the price of non-traded
goods in terms of the overall CPI, or in terms of the
price of internationally traded goods entering the US
CPI. Relevant definitions of these prices are provided
in Box 2.3 of this chapter.
To focus sharply on movements in these relative
prices, Obstfeld and Rogoff propose a stylised model
calibrated to the US economy in which employment
and capital in the traded goods and in the non-traded
goods sectors, and therefore also the outputs pro-
duced in the two sectors, are kept constant. The
authors study the changes in the consumption level,
consumption composition (between the two types of
goods) and relative income (the value of US output
relative to the rest of the world) necessary to eliminate
the current account deficit. 
The adjustment mechanism is as follows. To fill its
external financing gap, the US needs to raise its net
exports, that is, export more of the tradables pro-
duced and import less foreign tradables. This means
that the demand for tradables by US firms and house-
holds must fall and that the demand for US tradables
by the rest of the world must increase. 
Selling more US output abroad requires a drop in the
relative price of US tradable goods in the world mar-
ket. By definition this is a deterioration of the US
terms of trade. As traded output in the US and
abroad is held constant in the calculation, the size of
price adjustment will depend on the price elasticity of
the world demand for US tradables.
However, note that a fall in the price of US tradables
per se would raise, instead of reduce, the demand for
them by US firms and households. This is the reason
why adjustment also requires an even larger fall in the
price of US non-tradables, redirecting US demand
towards these goods. As a result, real depreciation
“switches” US consumption demand away from both
US and foreign tradables, in favour of US non-trad-
ables. This consumption “expenditure-switching”
effect corresponds to a change in the composition of
consumption. 
Moreover (and this is perhaps the most important
point), once the dollar has fallen in real terms US
households are poorer: the value of US non-tradable
output falls in terms of foreign goods, as does the
value of US tradables (the value of the latter falls
with the deterioration of the terms of trade). As US
income falls relative to the rest of the world, US con-
sumption also falls. In this model, a real depreciation
thus causes a US income and demand slow-down.
According to Obstfeld and Rogoff, most of the
required adjustment in the US real exchange rate is
attributed to the need for a fall in the relative price of
14 Recent contributions discussing alternative scenarios of adjust-
ment include Adalet and Eichengreen (2005), Clarida et al. (2005),
Croke et al. (2005), Edwards (2005), Faruqee et al. (2005), Freund
and Warnock (2005), Hunt and Rebucci (2003), Mann (1992) and
Mann and Plueck (2005).US non-tradables. In extensive quantitative experi-
mentation, these two authors calculate the overall
depreciation of the dollar in real trade-weighted
terms required to improve the US trade balance by
about five percentage points of GDP. The required
real rate of depreciation ranges between 15 and
34 percent, depending on the elasticity of substitution
between tradables and non-tradables as well as
between domestic and foreign tradables. Conversely,
adjustment in the terms of trade is quite contained,
ranging between four and seven percent. In other
words, at most one third of the adjustment can be
attributed to adjustment in the international prices of
US tradable goods.
The size of adjustment estimated by Obstfeld and
Rogoff is quite large, but not unusual as compared to
the swings that major currencies have experienced
over the last decades. Between its peak in 2002 and the
end of 2005, the dollar depreciated in real effective
terms by 24 percent (based on IMF data). The corre-
sponding nominal depreciation was as high as 31 per-
cent. A revaluation by China and other Asian coun-
tries will also contribute significantly to correcting the
external value of the dollar in real effective terms.15
The time horizon for the correction makes a differ-
ence. In the above model, import demand from the
US falls with a large real depreciation of the dollar,
because a real depreciation (at constant output and
employment) implies a contraction in US income rel-
ative to the rest of the world. But in the short run,
adjustment in US external demand may well be driven
by a slowdown in output and employment (see
Edwards 2005). A contraction in the production of
non-traded goods would reduce, at the margin, the
pressure on the exchange rate: with less non-tradables
produced, their relative price will have to fall by less
to match the increased demand by US households.
However, if the slowdown spills over to the traded
good sector (despite the favourable relative price
movements), this will add to depreciation pressures.
This is because with less tradables to exports, US
imports must fall by more, creating the need for
sharper depreciation in equilibrium.
In the medium run, employment and capital alloca-
tion are bound to change (with consumption). First,
part of the adjustment may take the form of an
increase in hours worked and labour participation,
instead of a drop in consumption (after all, a deterio-
ration in the US terms of trade means that house-
holds are poorer relative to other countries: labour
supply may increase in response to this negative in-
come shock). Second, production will be re-allocated
across sectors, in response to the increase in the rela-
tive price of tradables, raising the overall supply of
US exports. 
As regards the dynamics of net exports and terms of
trade, an important issue is the extent to which exter-
nal adjustment will occur via an increase in the quan-
tity of goods already exported, as opposed to an
increase in the range of exports (that is, the extent to
which adjustment will be at the “intensive” as
opposed to the “extensive” margin). The main point
here is that any exogenous shock to the ability of the
US to borrow ultimately leads to a larger external
demand for US goods. This can stimulate the supply
of US goods and goods varieties that were not previ-
ously exported. In equilibrium, the terms of trade are
likely to move less when new goods are exported than
when adjustment only takes place at the intensive
margin (exporting more of a given set of goods). In
other words, adjustment at the extensive margins can
further reduce or prevent altogether a fall in the terms
of trade, reducing the required equilibrium real depre-
ciation (Corsetti, Martin and Pesenti 2005, 2006).
Unfortunately, empirical studies on the US point to
worrisome regularities regarding the response of US
imports to exchange rate and income movements.
Recent studies confirm the asymmetry between the
US and other countries first noted by Houthakker
and Magee (1969): the income elasticity of US
imports well exceeds the income elasticity of other
advanced countries’ imports from the US. Thus, a
given fall in the imports-to-GDP ratio requires a
much stronger income slowdown in the US than
abroad. By the same token, US import price elastici-
ties are quite low.16 Chinn (2005) finds that one sixth
of US imports are apparently insensitive to exchange
rate variations (although another finding is that non-
oil, non-computer imports are much more sensitive to
exchange rate changes than aggregate imports). 
An important lesson from these considerations is that
adjustment will require a protracted period of real
dollar weakness, but the magnitude of further dollar
depreciation (that is whether and by how much the
dollar should further depreciate) is quite uncertain.
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15 The share of Asia in US imports was in fact as high as around
28 percent in 2004, up from 25 percent in 2000 (the share of US ex-
ports to Asia is much lower and quite variable).
16 See Hooper et al. 1998 and the quantitative analysis by Corsetti et
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The analysis by Obstfeld and Rogoff points to the
need for further real depreciation, but their approach
focuses on price elasticities between traded and non-
traded goods, whose estimates in the literature vary
markedly. Other complementary studies look into
other adjustment margins: consumption, the level of
employment, sectoral allocation of production, as
well as the composition of exports (intensive versus
extensive margins). The implications for equilibrium
movements in the dollar real exchange rate are quite
disparate.
Second, the main reason for expecting sharp dollar
depreciation, laid out in detail above, is that a sharp
dollar fall is required to drive down the price of US
non-tradables. So, while adjustment may well require
large depreciations of the dollar in real trade-weight-
ed terms, movements in the relative price of US
exports may actually remain quite small. What needs
to be sizeable is the correction in US net external
demand, but not necessarily the correction in US
export prices.
4.2 Dollar depreciation: portfolio valuation effects
We have already observed that, because of the par-
ticular currency composition of US foreign asset
and liabilities, dollar depreciation automatically
reduces the real net debt burden of the US.17 The
larger the valuation effects from depreciation, the
larger the fall in the real value of US net liabilities.
Note that a fall in the dollar helps the US external
position through two channels. The first is the tradi-
tional channel, through which dollar depreciation
encourages US net exports, improving the competi-
tiveness of US exporters, while discouraging US
imports. The second channel consists of valuation
effects, which raises the dollar value of US foreign
assets, improving the net external position of this
country. For this reason, valuation effects tend to
reduce the magnitude of dollar depreciation
required to achieve external adjustment, relative to
the case in which only the first channel is active. For
instance, in the model by Obstfeld and Rogoff
described above, valuation effects from dollar
depreciation could reduce the required rate of real
effective dollar depreciation by about five percent-
age points. These effects may help address current
imbalances but clearly are no substitute for net
export correction (see Obstfeld 2004).
Interestingly, as argued by Cavallo and Tille (2005),
valuation effects may do more than reducing the
overall magnitude of adjustment in trade: they can
actually play a substantial role in smoothing the
dollar decline along the path of adjustment. In the
experiments by these two authors, the US is
assumed to stabilise its stock of net external debt
relative to GDP. In the long run, the required rate
of real dollar depreciation is 27 percent (in their
baseline estimate). In the short run, sizeable capital
gains on gross external liabilities allow US house-
holds and firms to sustain current imports, reduc-
ing pressures on the exchange rates. Hence dollar
depreciation is below 10 percent, and around
15 percent in the first two years of external adjust-
ment. An important difference between short- and
long-run effects is that, over time, depreciation
expectations driving interest rates raise the cost of
debt, and therefore tend to reduce the overall mag-
nitude of valuation effects (see Section 2.3 of this
chapter). 
Nonetheless, some authors claim that advantages of
valuation effects are a stable long-run feature of US
borrowing, allowing the US to pay effectively nega-
tive returns on its net liabilities, a point forcefully
stressed by Gourinchas and Rey (2005a,b). In some
respects, this position is consistent with the evidence
on rate of return differentials in favour of the US,
which imply that this country can borrow on better
terms (discussed in Box 2.2 of this chapter). But the
fundamental issue is the extent to which a debtor
can count on valuation effects to depreciate system-
atically the real value of its liabilities. While asset
pricing may have played a large role in adjustment
historically, it is unlikely that a permanent net-debt
devaluation strategy is sustainable. Sooner or later,
international investors will price the risk of valua-
tion effects, leading to higher interest rates on the
US debt. 
So far, however, US long-term interest rates have not
moved significantly away from comparable euro area
rates. In the same spirit as a previous exercise by
Krugman in the 1980s, Obstfeld (2005) looks at the
return on inflation-indexed bonds issued in dollars
and in euros: in 2005 the return differentials between
the US and French 30-year debt instruments are just
a few basis points. In other words, markets do not
seem to attach any significant probability to the event
of a sizeable real depreciation of the dollar. The dol-
lar even appreciated during 2005 and earlier forecasts 17 See Section 2.3 above.of sharp redirections of portfolio flows away from the
US have so far been proven wrong.18
This is clearly a puzzle for those observers who
believe that further dollar depreciation and interna-
tional portfolio rebalancing is needed. If, as many
believe, markets are indeed mispricing adjustment
risks (it would not be the first time), the macroeco-
nomic consequences of market ‘inattention’ can be
quite far-reaching. To the extent that asset prices
suggest to policymakers that no correction is urgent
or necessary, imbalances may keep growing, mak-
ing adjustment much harsher and deeper in the
future.
4.3 Demand policies (fiscal correction in the US)
Even if revaluation of Asian currencies realign inter-
national relative prices in a way that is consistent with
a reduction in the current global imbalances, it is
doubtful that substantial correction will take place
without appropriate demand policies.
Conventional wisdom suggests that “expenditure
switching policies”(essentially, exchange rate revalua-
tion by Asian countries and benign neglect by the US
vis-à-vis a weak dollar) should be complemented by
“expenditure changing policies”. In China, for ins-
tance, a renminbi revaluation should be accompanied
by measures to sustain domestic demand (or at least
to remove current distortions that generate very high
savings). A reduction of Chinese national saving
would contribute to world demand, lowering this
country’s surplus more than implied by the loss of
“competitiveness” due to revaluation. It could also
help contain the strain on the Chinese economy due
to relative price changes.
The most important contribution to adjustment
should, however, come from a reduction in the US fis-
cal deficits, which requires a revision of tax policy.
Without any fiscal rebalancing in the US, a reduction
in Asian saving, possibly associated with a slowdown
or reversal in reserve accumulation, increases the
risks of financial strain in the global currency and
asset markets, due to disorderly adjustment charac-
terised by a loss of confidence in the dollar and finan-
cial turmoil.
In principle, a pick-up in European demand could
also provide a valuable contribution to global rebal-
ancing. There is, however, considerable scepticism
about such a possibility. In many European countries,
private consumption growth has been persistently low
(see Chapter 1), for reasons that are not entirely
understood. As argued in Chapter 1, high debt levels
in the euro area in combination with future demo-
graphic strains imply that there is little or no room for
fiscal stimulus in Europe.
5. A European perspective
This chapter has analysed various adjustment sce-
narios and policy options for reducing the macro-
economic risks associated with increasing global
imbalances. Reducing the size of the US current
account deficit does require an increase in US sav-
ing (both public and private) relative to the rest of
the world, and/or an increase in spending in the rest
of the world relative to the US. Depending on its
intensity, adjustment may produce a slowdown in
US growth and/or a prolonged period of dollar
weakness in real terms. Both factors will contribute
to a drop in US net imports. As is well known, the
response of the trade balance to real exchange rate
changes usually takes time: in the case of the US
the lag is traditionally quite long (see Krugman
1991) for an analysis of the so-called J-curve effect
in the US). 
While there is considerable uncertainty as to the tim-
ing and intensity of adjustment, most of the scenarios
reviewed above have potentially negative conse-
quences for the European macroeconomy. Europe is
likely to face a further weakening of external demand
for its products, as well as increasing competitive pres-
sure from the US (although the overall consequences
of adjustment for Europe will also depend on the
intensity of policy correction in Asian countries:
higher demand in these countries would obviously
have some positive effect on European net exports).
In addition, portfolio rebalancing, redirection of cap-
ital flows and the associated swings in asset prices and
exchange rates may have important effects on the
value of European assets and liabilities, raising the
likelihood of financial turmoil involving European




18 In his blog (http://www.rgemonitor.com/blog), Roubini lists a
series of contingent factors which may explain the strengthening of
the dollar in 2005. The list includes: widening of short-term interest
rate differentials between, on the one hand, the US and, on the other,
the euro area and Japan; growth differentials in favour of the US; the
effect of temporary measures, such as the Homeland Investment
Act, providing a tax incentive for profit repatriation; political factors
related to the constitutional referendum failures in Europe; and in-
creasing reservations about the pace and depth of the European inte-
gration process.EEAG Report 65
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To begin with, even though the overall European cur-
rent account imbalance with the US is small relative
to other macro regions, the external performance of
individual European countries is quite diverse. The
new EU members (as expected) run external deficits.19
Some old EU members (notably Germany) enjoy a
strong export performance, while some others
(notably Italy) have experienced a deterioration of
their competitiveness. In this context, the real and
financial dimensions of global adjustment are likely
to have asymmetric effects on the European economy.
Adjustment of global imbalances may or may not
require further dollar depreciation vis-à-vis the euro.
However, even if adjustment takes place with no fur-
ther fall in the dollar and/or with limited movements
in international prices, correcting the US current
account deficit does require an improvement in US
net exports. It follows that Europe is likely to experi-
ence a drop in external demand even if the associated
exchange rate movements are not as large as many
fear. In addition, an important question is whether
the US will decide to reverse its attitude towards free
trade, generating a new wave of protectionism. If this
is the case, we may witness some reduction in trade
among macro regions, with uncertain effects on the
cohesion of the European economy. 
Through valuation effects, further dollar depreciation
will make Europe poorer relative to the US. It is true
that Europe has a small net foreign asset position, but
the magnitude of valuation effects depends on the size
of the stocks of gross assets and liabilities. With
financial globalisation, these gross stocks are several
times larger than the net asset position. These effects
may also create asymmetric effects across Europe,
depending on the size of a country’s total foreign
assets and liabilities, as well as on the currency and
maturity structure of these portfolios. 
The last few years have been characterised by very low
long-term interest rates in real terms, lower than pre-
dicted by standard economic models (and conven-
tional wisdom). This may change with the start of an
adjustment process leading to a reduction of the US
current account. The reversal of capital flows and
portfolio allocation may lead to the emergence of
larger risk premia (also within the euro area) and
upward pressure on interest rates. The risks associat-
ed with high prices in the housing markets of many
countries have been frequently discussed (see Chap-
ter 5 of the 2005 EEAG Report). Increases in long-
term interest rates could clearly cause substantial falls
in housing prices. 
Further depreciation of the dollar in real effective
terms, associated with rising interest rates and the
emergence of interest rate differentials also among
European countries, could clearly exacerbate business
cycle and inflation differentials in Europe. Past expe-
rience and common sense suggest that consumer
prices and growth may respond more intensely to euro
exchange rate movements in smaller and more open
European economies than in the large economies.
The resolution of current imbalances may well pro-
ceed rather smoothly. But it is also possible that the
current build-up of imbalances will lead to ‘hard
landing’ scenarios. What risks do European policy-
makers face?
Consider first the possibility of a disorderly adjust-
ment, if and when international financial markets
become unwilling to roll over their credit to the US.
This means a US current account reversal associated
with strong relative price and exchange rate move-
ments, creating financial turmoil across markets: risk
premia will rise markedly, housing markets may col-
lapse, US demand could falter, and the dollar may fall
dramatically. 
In this scenario, it is highly plausible that European
financial and non-financial firms would suffer from
strong deterioration of their balance sheet and liquid-
ity shortages. This scenario would call for European
monetary and supervisory authorities to stress-test
their institutional framework. The 2003 EEAG report
analysed the regulatory and supervisory framework
for European financial markets (see Chapter 4 of that
report), assessing its effectiveness in intervening in
defence of the European payment and financial sys-
tem, and in reducing the liquidity costs for firms of
financial turmoil. The report pointed out concerns
related to the decentralised structure and complexity
of the framework.
Technically, interventions providing emergency liq-
uidity to firms and financial markets do not need to
compromise the ability of the ECB to retain control
over aggregate liquidity in the euro area. Injections in
one region could be compensated with opposite inter-
ventions somewhere else. On the other hand, if the
magnitude of financial crisis is large enough to gener-
ate substantial uncertainty about default rates by 19 See Chapter 5 of the 2004 EEAG report.firms and banks, monetary authorities may face diffi-
cult trade-offs between financial stability and price
stability, as monetary interventions may not be effec-
tive in preventing widespread default. Governments
may then have to shoulder large fiscal costs to avoid
a chain of destabilising bankruptcies. This raises
important issues about the distribution of possible
fiscal costs across countries. The deteriorating public
finances in many European countries, which were dis-
cussed at length in Section 3.3 in Chapter 1 of this
report, are an aggravating factor in this context. Weak
public finances may create undue constraints on
emergency financing in the case of a crisis associated
with a “hard” unwinding of global imbalances. This
provides yet another argument for fiscal discipline
now as a precaution against future financial crisis. 
In the event of a sharp correction of the dollar and a
deep US recession, monetary authorities in Europe
(the ECB and the national central banks in the coun-
tries outside the eurozone) must react to deflationary
pressure (coming from likely falls in export prices and
export volumes) by loosening the monetary stance.
The timing of intervention will be an issue, as proac-
tive pre-emptive interest rate cuts may be warranted
in such a situation. 
Overall, however, even if European monetary authori-
ties are successful in fighting financial contagion and
other undesired effects of liquidity shortages due to
large price swings in asset markets, Europe would still
face a severe aggregate demand problem well beyond
the reach of monetary policy and, as argued in our pre-
vious reports, also of fiscal policy. Perhaps the most
important risk for Europe associated with global imbal-
ances is that of facing a severe crisis without effective
policy instruments to stabilise the European economy.
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